

Of the 24 only 9 are classified as essential. Of the 9, one is already U.S.-British (Canton) and one is logically an expansion of the present Canal Zone base necessitated by the development of modern aircraft (additional airfields in the Panama Republic). This leaves 7 bases under the sovereignty of 4 different nations.

The heart of this requirement is Iceland, Greenland and the Azores.

In none of the 7 does the requirement include U.S. sovereignty. In five, we ask as the minimum requirement the long-term right to use the military base jointly; and in two, we ask for a minimum requirement the right to participate on the favored nation principle.

Of the 9 essential bases 7 are for use of both the Army and the Navy. The remaining 2 (Ascension and Airfields in Republic of Panama) are Army Air Bases.

Required Bases - 25 - Some Action on 10 Already

Turning to the remaining 25 locations these are classified as required if reasonably obtainable but not absolutely essential to the base system. Of the 25, 2 are already disputed with the British (Funa Futi and Christmas), 2 are way stations in the East Indies belonging to the Dutch where it is understood some agreement is already under way (Morotai and Blak), 2 are in Cuba where negotiations have started (Batista and St. Julian-Lafe), 2 are air routes in Canada which should logically be handled through Canadian-U.S. Joint Defense agreement, 1 is Tarawa on which the American

*Panama  
Army Air*

U.S. AIR FORCE

18

deployment would be 42,500 air and 10,700 Ground and service forces. However, at only 5 of these bases is it planned to deploy any personnel at the present time.

At the remaining 4 there would be only air communications and weather personnel, if any, and none are presently planned.

Weather bases listed as required if reasonably obtainable by negotiation,

it is presently planned to deploy at six of the bases only 4,324 air communications and weather personnel and no ground or service personnel in the post-war period. In

the remaining 19 the rights we have obtained would lie dormant until an emergency, except for perhaps some air communications and weather personnel. None are now planned for these bases:

Comments:

- Base Planning
- Implementation
- Liaison with State Dept.
- Coord. & Reports
- Projects
- Planning
- Operating
- Reg. Doc.

Non-American

Action by  
Signed \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

- Original Copy Retained
- Dispatch
- File

*Approved*  
*5*  
*Bases*

TOP SECRET

b. "A Long Term Strategic Plan for the Defense of the Panama Canal, 1945" as amended by your letter, GUC 361 (16 Jan 46), 23 January 1946; subject: Revisions to Strategic Plan for Defense of the Panama Canal.

2. JCS 570/40 lists the Airfields in the Republic of Panama as a secondary base area essential for the protection of and for access to a primary base (in this case the Panama Canal Zone) and for the protection of military operations. The United States desires exclusive rights as a sovereign and joint rights as a military base.

3. In accordance with Paragraph 5 of JCS 570/40, the agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are preparing a report on airfields in the Republic of Panama for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to forward to the Secretary of State. This report will include military requirements for specific Panama airfields and an elaboration of the rights desired within the Republic of Panama.

4. In order to provide guidance to War Department representatives on the Joint Agencies, it is desired that you submit recommendations on the airfields in the Republic of Panama to reach the War Department by 15 March 1946 and to include the following:

a. Outline map showing present airfields indicating airfields (pre sent or proposed) which you recommend for permanent use.

b. Brief descriptions of physical characteristics of airfields and

TOP SECRET

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**TOP SECRET**

VH Det.  
B  
c. VIB airfields should be suitable for construction to accommodate gross loads of 320,000 lbs. and runways should be capable of being lengthened to 8,500 feet with overruns of 1000 feet at each end.

6. An extract of JCS 570/46 is included as Inclosure No. 3 as an example of rights to be requested from a foreign nation in a typical base area.

7. It is desired that any field surveys which may be conducted be limited to areas at which the U. S. military now has rights under existing wartime agreements and that such surveys be so conducted as to preclude no or comment on the part of the Paraguayan Government.

8. It is desired that two additional copies of the plan referred to in Paragraph 1 b be forwarded by Army Courier Service.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

*Edward F. ITSELL*

EDWARD F. ITSELL  
Major General  
The Adjutant General

3 Incls.

Incl. 1 - Pacelins troop deployment.

Incl. 2 - Postwar missions and requirements.

Incl. 3 - Extract of JCS 570/46.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Commanding General, Army Air Forces (1)

Commanding General, Army Service Forces (5)

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, JCS (1)

Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, JCS (5)

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Bahrain Islands	Saudi Arabia	Joint or Participating
Bermuda	British colony	Participating (British empire only)
Canary Islands	Spain	Joint
Cairo	Egypt	Joint or Participating
Casablanca	French colony	Joint or Participating
Canton Island (Boerdtz Group)	U.S.-British condominium	- - - - -
Curacao-Aruba	Venezuela	Joint or Participating
Dhahran	Saudi Arabia	Joint or Participating
Galapagos	Ecuador	Participating (with American nations only)
Georgetown (Atkinson Field)	British Guiana	- - - - -
Hadhramaut	Saudi Arabia	Joint or Participating
Johnston Island	U.S.	- - - - -
Karachi	India	Joint or Participating
Kwajalein (Marshall Islands)	Former Jap mandate	- - - - -
Marcus	Japan	Exclusive
Massaua	Eritrea	Joint or Participating
Monrovia	Liberia	Joint or Participating
Oman	Saudi Arabia	Joint or Participating
Oran	Algeria	Joint or Participating

**TOP SECRET**

Socotra Island	Saudi Arabia	Joint or Participating
Tripoli	Iran	Joint or Participating
Truk	Former Jap mandate	- - - -
Trucial Oman	Saudi Arabia	Joint or Participating
Tunis - Bizerte	Tunisia	Joint or Participating
Venezuelan Oil Fields	Venezuela	Joint or Participating
*Foggia	Italy	Joint or Participating
*Kunming	China	Joint or Participating

TOTAL SUBSIDIARY BASE AREAS - 36

\* (JCS is in process of studying requirements for these two bases. It is anticipated that their use will be desired.)

**TOP SECRET**

—	Kharaapur	India	"	"
—	Merida	Mexico	"	"
—	Natal-Recife	Brazil	"	"
	Noumea (New Caledonia)	French Colony	"	"
	Rangoon	Burma	"	"
	Saigon	French-Indo-China	"	"
—	Salinas	Ecuador	"	"
—	San Jose	Guatemala	"	"
—	Surinam	Dutch Guiana (Dutch colony)	"	"
—	Talara	Peru	"	"
	Tehran	Iran	"	"
—	Tehuantepec	Mexico	"	"
	Upolu	British. Samoa	"	"
	Viti Levu (Fiji Islands)	British Colony	"	"
	Wake	U. S.	"	"

TOTAL NUMBER OF SITES WHERE RIGHTS OF TRANSIT & TECHNICAL STOP ARE DESIRED - 21

**TOP SECRET**

*Transit  
Passes*

BASE RIGHTS

Joint right is the right to use for military purposes, in common with the nation exercising sovereignty, mandate or trusteeship, an area, installation or facility; and to debar any other nation from such use unless it is mutually agreed between the United States and the nation exercising sovereignty, mandate or trusteeship, that another nation or nations may share use.

Participating right is the right to share, on the most favored nation principle, with the nation exercising sovereignty, mandate or trusteeship, and with any other nation which that nation may accord the right to participate, in the use for military purposes of an area, installations or facility.

Transit right is the right of military air transit and technical stop as defined in SNMCC 38/30.

**TOP SECRET**

*definitions of  
primary and Subsidiary  
Transit*

on "Over-all Examination of U. S. Military Worth or Security Rights"; to arrive at conclusions based on the military worth or security areas in conformance with the overall strategic concept and on a realistic appraisal of the current situation; and to evolve recommendations as to what action is required.

3. Basing its conclusion on the military worth of certain geographical areas in conformance with the over-all strategic concept, budgetary, and manpower limitations, the study lists Hawaiian Islands, the Marianas - Bonins, The Ryukyus, Alaska and the Aleutians, Newfoundland and Labrador, Greenland and Iceland, The Azores, The Caribbean and Panama, and Canada (jointly with Canada) as areas which are vital to the security of the U. S., and designated as primary base areas. The recommended system of bases evolved in this study, considered a U. S. requirement predicated on the foreseeable future, are listed in each of the several categories in the Annex to Appendix "A", shown on chart (Appendix "B") and tabulated in Annex to Appendix "A", Appendix "A", (Memorandum for the SALTAC) requests SALTAC to inform the Secretary of State of the results of this study in order that necessary action may be taken to secure base rights to those bases required in peacetime, under currently estimated world conditions, if the U. S. is to have that adequate military posture which is essential to the United States security.

4. P&O Action: Memo to CINCPAC fuds JCS 570/83 for info. Cy of P&O CINCPAC, Memo (to CINCPAC) 10CG's AGF, CDC, & AOTFAC, D/P&A, D/I, D/OPRT, D/SS&P, I&ID, CINCHLANT, HD, Adv Gp to C/S, Ch Opr Gp P&O, Chs West Hem Br & Overseas Br (thru: Ch, Opr Gp P&O), PJBD Canada-U. S. (Attn: Maj Gen Henry); w/o Incl to C/S USAF.

5. Implementation of this Special Distribution Paper approved by Colonel W. J. Verbeck, Asst Chief P&P Group, P&O.

Chief, Operations & Planning Group  
W/Incl to C/S, USAF  
C/S, USAF, 6/1/53

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P&O File 6097

ACIONS  
P&P

Handwritten notes in red ink: "New 1047", "base", and "Primer".

b. "A Long Term Strategic Plan for the Defense of the Panama Canal, 1945" as amended by CDO Letter 23 January 1946, subject "Revisions to Strategic Plan for Defense of the Panama Canal", file CRO 381 (16 Jan 46).

"2. JCS 570/40 lists the Airfields in the Republic of Panama as a secondary base area essential for the protection of and for access to a primary base (in this case the Panama Canal Zone) and for the protection of military operations. The United States desires exclusive rights as a maximum and joint rights as a minimum.

"3. In accordance with Paragraph 5 of JCS 570/40, the agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are preparing a report on Airfields in the Republic of Panama for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to forward to the Secretary of State. This report will include military requirements for specific Panama airfields and an elaboration of the rights desired within the Republic of Panama.

"4. In order to provide guidance to War Department representatives on the Joint Agencies, it is desired that you submit recommendations on the Airfields in the Republic of Panama to reach the War Department by 15 March 1946, and to include the following:

- a. Outline map showing present airfields indicating airfields (present or proposed) which you recommend for permanent use.
- b. Brief descriptions of physical characteristics of airfields and other major supporting installations, to include auxiliary facilities.
- c. Recommendations as to what sites should be requested in diplomatic negotiations for long term rights, notes and bounds are not required. For example "Rio Hato Airbase" would be sufficient description.

RETURN TO O. P. D. SHOWING ACTION **TOP SECRET**

CONFIDENTIAL

RECOMMENDATIONS  
Provide a system of operational air bases in conjunction with the air bases in the Panama Canal Zone to accomplish mission of these bases.

Maintain and construct facilities as indicated in Inclosures No. 3 and 4.

Assist in maintaining security of LOC through the eastern approaches to the

Panama Canal and to the northern part of South America.

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure No. 2

the Canal Zone may be assumed, for the purpose of this survey, to be as indicated in Inlosure No. 2.

9. VIB airfields should be suitable for construction to accommodate gross loads of 300,000lbs. and runways should be capable of being lengthened to 8,500 feet with overruns of 1000 feet at each end.

10. An extract of JCS 570/46 is included as Inlosure No. 3 as an example of rights to be requested from a foreign nation in a typical base area.

11. It is declared that any field surveys which may be conducted be limited to areas at which the U. S. military now has rights under existing wartime agreements and that such surveys be so conducted as to preclude notice or comment on the part of the Panamanian Government.

12. It is requested that two additional copies of the plan referred to in Paragraph 1 be forwarded by Army Courier Service.

2. That copies be furnished as follows:

- 5 OPD
- 5 CG, ASP
- 1 CG, MAP
- 1 G-2

FEB 9 11 46 AM



FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPD:

ACTION TAKEN: 12 February 1946

I. Ltr. to CG, GOC

II. Gys furnished as indicated.

ESM/1q ID-863 Pentagon

OPD OUT WMA

- 3 Incls
1. Penetration troop deployment
  2. Postwar missions and requirements.
  3. Extract of JCS 570/46.

ROBERT. P. TATE  
Colonel, GSC  
Chief, Base Planning Section

RETURN TO O. P. D. SHOWING ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Requirements

Provide a system of operational air bases in conjunction with the air bases in the Panama Canal Zone to accomplish mission of these bases.

Maintain and construct facilities as indicated in Inlosures No. 3 and 4.

Assist in maintaining security of IOC through the eastern approaches to the

2. In 19 July 1946 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a proposed memorandum to the Department of State which specified a requirement for thirty-five defense sites in the Republic of Panama. This was subsequently transmitted as SSMWC 38/12.

3. For additional facts bearing on the problem see Appendix "B".

QUESTIONS

4. A strategic outline of the world situation and an analysis of enemy capabilities and intentions indicates little likelihood of attack on the canal within the foreseeable future -- ten years.

5. Should an attack eventuate during this period the best probable form would be sabotage designed to destroy one or more vital installations of the canal.

6. Long range strategic reconnaissance and a peripheral air warning and fighter field system would be of little value against types of attack which the enemy is most capable of launching.

*no attack w/in 10 yrs*

*War Dept - No  
air threat - None  
probably sabotage.*

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